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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ELIZABETH IRENE REISER, by
and through her Guardian,
RICHARD E. REISER and
ELEANOR REISER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
RICHARD LOHNER and HOWARD
FRANCIS, Medical Doctors,
and PROVO OBSTETRICAL AND
GYNECOLOGY CLINIC, INC.,
a Professional corporation,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 16,444

Defendants-Respondents. )
)

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendants agree generally with the Statement of- the
Kind of Case as set forth in the plaintiffs' Brief, denying,
however, any malpractice in the treatment of Eleanor Reiser
during her pregnancy with Elizabeth.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Defendants agree generally with the plaintiffs'
discussion of the Disposition in the Lower Court in plaintiffs'
Brief.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Judgments entered and the Rulings made by the
District Court be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants do not agree with many of the facts or the
interpretation of facts as set forth in plaintiffs' Brief.
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Defendants agree that Richard and Eleanor Reiser had u
Rh incompatibility and that Eleanor Reiser was Rh sensitized. Rh
sensitivity is the development of antibodies in an Rh negative
mother which occurs at the time of delivery of the first Rh positive baby.

The antibodies are then present thereafter to affect

future Rh positive babies, by actually crossing the placental
barrier and attaching themselves to the red blood cells of the
fetus ultimately causing destruction of those cells.
During the pregnancy of the fifth child, David, defendant Dr. Howard Francis induced labor at 38 weeks of pregnancy
because of Rh sensitization and because of emotional and physical
upset of the patient Mrs. Reiser.

(R.

1135, 1394, 1507, 1726)

Dr. Francis had determined that induction of labor was a suitable
alternative to leaving the fetus in the womb inasmuch as the cer·
vix was soft and effaced or thinning out, which made the conditions favorable for induction.

(R. 1726)

In the latter part of 1970, and the early part of 1971,
Mrs. Reiser was in her sixth pregnancy.

By this time, defendants

had developed a rotation system for seeing patients, which
allowed the patient to become acquainted and familiar with each
of the physicians in the clinic who might be called upon to
deliver the patient's child.
Dr. Lobner first saw Mrs. Reiser at the defendants'
medical clinic on June 24, 1971, which was approximately the 38~
week of pregnancy.

At the time of this visit, Dr. Lehner

reviewed the clinical charts for Mrs. Reiser and learned that sM
was Rh negative.

(R. 1503)
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During the course of the June 24, 1971 examination, a
"titer test" was performed, which was an evaluation of a sample of
Mrs. Reiser's blood.

The titer test is simply a measurement of

the level of Rh sensitivity in the mother, and is not an accurate
measurement of the status or involvement of the fetus.

For

example, it is possible to have a rather significant titer
reading, meaning there is a high level of sensitivity, but the
fetus itself may be Rh negative and not in danger from the
mother's antibodies, or Rh positive but not affected to the point
of danger.

(R. 1311-1333, 1429, 1510-1511)

This was the first

titer test taken on this pregnancy.
The June 24th test results were received by Dr. Lehner
on June 26, 1971.

(R. 1507-1508, plaintiffs' Exhibit 6)

The

test of 1:128 revealed a significant titer, indicating the possibility that the fetus was in some danger, depending again on the
individual capability of this infant to resist the antibodies.
Mrs. Reiser was asked to come in that same day, June 26, 1971, to
discuss the options available to properly care for the mother and
child.

One of the options discussed was to induce labor, which

Dr. Lehner would have preferred if the conditions were favorable.
(R. 1236-1237)

Dr. Lehner explained to Mrs. Reiser that the

fetus may be severely involved with the Rh problem and that
induction would be the best route to take, but that he wanted to
do a vaginal examination to assess the status of the cervix and
determine whether conditions were favorable for induction.
(R. 1511-1516)
The examination revealed that the conditions were not
favorable for induction inasmuch as the cervix was "thick and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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firm", rather than soft and effaced as in the fifth pregnancy
where labor was induced.

(R. 1511-1512)

As induction of labor

was further discussed, Mrs. Reiser reported that she had had two
prior inductions and that they were the worst experiences she had
ever had and if there was another alternative, she would like

~

take a chance on waiting for the natural delivery of the child,
(R. 1138, 1517)
Dr. Lobner then explained to Mrs. Reiser that an
amniocentesis could be performed to more accurately determine the
status of the baby.

The amniocentesis procedure as explained to

Mrs. Reiser requires the insertion of a needle probe and the
extraction of sample fluid from the amniotic sac.

The level of

the baby's involvement with the Rh factor is measured quantitatively by an analysis of the amount of bilirubin in the
amniotic fluid.

The more elevated the bilirubin level becomes,

the greater danger to the baby.
Once the involvement of the fetus is determined, the
future management of the Rh factor can be decided.
is severely involved and incapable of surviving, the

If the fetus
obstetrici~

can induce labor or take the child by cesarean section unless the
infant is not mature enough to exist outside the environment of
the uterus, in which event an intra-uterine transfusion can be
given.

If the involvement of the fetus is not severe, then ~e

pregnancy will be allowed to continue.
Dr. Lobner explained to Mrs. Reiser the usual complic~
tions and risks that are associated with the amniocentesis
including sticking the baby with the needle and inducing infecSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tion within the uterus.

(R. 1518)

Mrs. Reiser was aware that if the Rh incompatibility was
bad enough in this pregnancy that it could cause very severe
damage to the baby, (R. 1138), and realizing that, she decided
and agreed with Dr. Lobner that an amniocentesis would be a
suitable alternative so as to more accurately determine the
status of the baby.

(R. 1519)

Mrs. Reiser was then prepared for the amniocentesis and
or. Lohner took the patient's blood pressure and found it to be
within the normal range, although he did not record the blood
pressure reading because of the unexpected occurrences after the
amniocentesis.

(R. 1522)

Mrs. Reiser was placed on her back for the amniocentesis.
During the procedure Mrs. Reiser did not appear to be in any
distress, was not perspiring and did not complain of any
problems.

(R. 1197-1198, 1527-1528)
Following the amniocentesis, Dr. Lobner left the exami-

nation room, leaving Mrs. Reiser in the care of his registered
nurse, Grace Nielsen.

Mrs. Nielsen asked Mrs. Reiser how she

felt, and Mrs. Reiser responded by saying, "I feel fine."

The

nurse then obtained for Mrs. Reiser a glass of water from the
lab, and as Mrs. Reiser was raising up to drink the water, she
suddenly said, "Don't let me fall" and began to get pale as if
she were going to faint.

Mrs. Nielsen then reassured Mrs. Reiser

that she would not let her fall and tried to get the table back
down.

She then called for the other nurse, Delores Bahr, to come

in and assist her in getting the table down.
1205-1206)

(R. 1181-1182,

The testimony differs from that point on whether
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Mrs. Bahr or Mrs. Nielsen went to obtain some smelling salts
while the other nurse stayed with Mrs. Reiser.

Mrs. Bahr remem-

bers that she could not find the smelling salts and that she
stayed with Mrs. Reiser while Mrs. Nielsen went to find them.

At

this point Mrs. Bahr said Mrs. Reiser was lying on her right side
facing Mrs. Bahr.

(R. 1607-1608)

As Mrs. Bahr looked at

Mrs. Reiser she suddenly noticed that her color was dark so she
called Dr. Lobner who immediately came into the examining room
and made the diagnosis of cardiac arrest and started his
tative efforts.

resu~~

(R. 1608)

Dr. Lobner immediately gave Mrs. Reiser a big thump on
the chest, established an airway, began mouth-to-mouth respirations and closed chest cardiac massage.

He asked his nurse Grace

Nielsen to contact an internist and have him meet them at the
hospital.

He asked the other nurse Delores Bahr to call the

ambulance.

(R. 1208, 1609)

Dr. Lobner continued his resuscitative efforts after the
ambulance arrived and he was with Mrs. Reiser until they arrived at
the hospital at 11:40 a.m., which was approximately ten minutes
after Dr. Lobner had first diagnosed the cardiac arrest.
(R.

1541)

Resuscitation efforts continued at the hospital.

The

cardiac arrest was diagnosed as "ventricular fibrillation".
On the following morning after the cardiac arrest,
June 27, 1971, plaintiff Eleanor Reiser gave birth to Elizabeth.
The labor was probably induced by the shock and trauma associated
with the cardiac arrest.

(R. 1697)

the child had severe brain damage.

It soon became apparent that
Every physician who test1'f'ied
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including both expert witnesses produced by plaintiffs, agreed
that the cause of the infant's brain damage was "anoxia", which
is a lack of oxygen to the infant's brain resulting from the cardiac arrest.

(R. 1054, 1285-1286, 1318, 1428)

Every physician

agreed that the brain damage had nothing to do with the Rh factor
or with the attack of the mother's antibodies upon the infant's
blood.

(R. 1057, 1428)
At some time on June 26, 1971, subsequent to the cardiac

arrest, the serum obtained through the amniocentesis test was
sent by Dr. Lohner's staff to the lab for analysis.

The result

was a finding of .03, which is in the "moderate" range.

After

the infant was born, the reports of the pediatrician reveal again
only a moderate involvement with the Rh factor, and all of this
indicated to each physician who testified that the baby's brain
damage was not in any way related to the Rh factor.

(Plaintiffs'

Exhibit 6; R. 1050-1057; First Transcript of Proceedings,
pp. 120-121, 576)

Plaintiffs' experts testified that the probable cause of
the cardiac arrest which produced the anoxia causing the infant's
brain damage, was a condition known as "supine hypotensive
syndrome."

This is a condition caused by depression of the vena

cava vein by the uterus together with insufficient collateral
circulation, which has been reported to cause some discomfort,
nausea, sweating and other similar signs and symptoms.
(R. 1318-1322, 1399-1400, 1409-1410, 1695)

Although a few women

in the late stages of pregnancy may develop a supine hypotensive
syndrome, all of the physicians, including plaintiffs' experts,
agreed that never in medical history had it been reported that
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this condition led to a cardiac arrest.

(R. 1294-1296,

1364-1369, 1412, 1418, 1685-1687, 1812)
Because the infant's brain damage was not in any way a
result of the Rh factor and because plaintiffs' theory of negli·
gence against the doctors related to leaving the patient on her
back too long resulting in supine hypotensive syndrome, the trial
court excluded the evidence of a failure to take a titer test

a~

an amniocentesis prior to June 26, 1971, which would have been
expected as part of the normal treatment given to an Rh sensitized pregnant woman.
The case was submitted to the jury on the questions of
whether Dr. Lohner was negligent in allowing Mrs. Reiser to lie
on her back for an excessive period of time, and whether
Dr. Lehner was negligent in the resuscitative efforts used to
revive Mrs. Reiser.

The jury answered "no" to both questions and

the court entered a judgment of no cause of action.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING
EVIDENCE THAT A TITER TEST WAS NOT TAKEN
AND THAT AN AMNIOCENTESIS WAS NOT GIVEN
PRIOR TO JUNE 26, 1971.
Defendants filed a Motion in Limine prior to trial to
exclude evidence that a titer test was not taken nor was an
amniocentesis given to Mrs. Reiser prior to June 26, 1971.
Defendants contended that such evidence was not relevant or
material to the issues because there was no causal connnection
between these omissions and the brain damage, and that the
admission of this irrelevant or minimally probative evidence
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would be highly and unfairly prejudicial to defendants.
Defendants' motion was granted.
The question of whether to exclude evidence is always at
least a two-step analysis for the trial court.

The evidence must

first be "relevant" and if it is determined that it is
•relevant", then it must be asked whether it should be excluded
under some other rule, such as the prejudicial impact the evidence may have as weighed against its probative value.

See

Byers v. Santiam Ford, Inc., 574 P.2d 1122 (Ore. 1978), and Utah
Rules of Evidence 1. (2), and 45.
A.

Evidence That The Earlier Tests Were Not Performed Is

Not Relevant Or Material Because These Omissions Were Not A
Proximate Cause Of Plaintiff's Injuries.
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (U.R.E.) states
that "except as otherwise provided • • • all relevant evidence is
admissible."

The implication of Rule 7 is that the evidence must

first be "relevant" in order to be admissible and secondly, the
relevant evidence itself may be inadmissible because of some
other rule.
Relevant evidence is defined by Rule 1. (2) of the Utah
Rules of Evidence as follows:
• evidence having any tendency in
reason to prove or disprove the existence
of any material fact.
(Emphasis added)
The evidence of the omission of the earlier tests in the
instant case may be proof of the fact that the tests were not
performed and that the management of this Rh sensitized pregnancy
was not adequate, but such evidence is not "material" to the
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issues in the lawsuit because the Rh factor had nothing to do
with the infant's brain damage.

Consequently the trial court

excluded the failure to take the earlier tests, reasoning that
such omissions could not have been a cause or a proximate cause
of plaintiff's injuries and therefore such evidence was irrelevant and immaterial or of little probative value.

Clearly the

decision to exclude evidence is within the sound discretion of
the trial court judge.

Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 565

P.~

1139 (Utah 1977), State v. Minnish, 560 P.2d 340 (Utah 1977),
There is no dispute in this case that the Rh factor

d~

not contribute to the infant plaintiff's brain damage, and that
the actual cause of the brain injury was "anoxia", which

result~

from lack of oxygen to the brain cells of the infant during the
cardiac arrest.

Plaintiffs' experts both testified to this fact.

(R. 1318, 1428)
Furthermore, it is plaintiff's position that the cardiac
arrest, which then led to the infant's brain damage, was caused
by leaving Mrs. Reiser on her back too long which resulted in
"supine hypotensive syndrome".

(R. 1318-1319, 1401)

This

syndrome is totally unrelated to the Rh factor.
1.

The Jury Has Removed A Vital Link In Plaintiffs'

Chain Of Causation.
In an effort to ?ttach liability from the test
omissions, plaintiffs argue a chain of causation something like
the following:

The earlier tests were not performed and con-

sequently Dr. Lobner performed an amniocentesis at 38 weeks
pregnancy, and that such act, which was not necessary, resulted
in Mrs. Reiser lying flat on her back, and that defendants were
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negligent in allowing Mrs. Reiser to stay on her back, which then
led to a condition known as supine hypotensive syndrome, which
then led to ventricular fibrillation, which then led to the
anoxia or lack of oxygen to the infant's brain cells, thereby
causing the brain damage to the infant.
One obvious problem with this theory is that a vital
link in plaintiffs' "chain" of causation has already been removed
by the jury.

The jury has definitely decided that Dr. Lohner was

not negligent in allow{ng Mrs. Reiser to stay on her back for an
excessive period of time.

The jury obviously felt that Mrs.

Reiser did not suffer from supine hypotensive syndrome, or that
the syndrome was not the cause of the cardiac arrest, or that
such a possibility was simply not foreseeable to a reasonable
physician.

In any case, if the failure to perform the earlier

tests somehow contributed to the decision to place Mrs. Reiser on
her back, such omissions cannot be a proximate cause of the
infant's brain damage because the causal connection has been
severed.

Even if plaintiffs could feasibly present a "chain of

causation" prior to the jury verdict, such an effort now appears
"moot" in light of the verdict.
2.

The Reason Mrs. Reiser was On Her Back Is Not

Relevant Or causally Related To The Infant's

Brain Damage.

Even if plaintiffs' argument wasn't moot, plaintiff's
causation argument is something like saying that going for a walk
on a Sunday afternoon was the proximate cause of an autopedestrian accident.

The first event is merely a condition

making injury possible from later intervening events.
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_,,_

It is admitted by plaintiffs that performing the
'

amniocentesis procedure itself, i.e. insertion of the needle in
the abdomen--had nothing to do with the arrest.

On the contrary,

it is plaintiffs' claim that leaving Mrs. Reiser on her back too
long caused the supine hypotensive syndrome which in turn caused
the arrest.

The amniocentesis was simply the reason under the

facts of this case for Mrs. Reiser being on her back.

She

cou~

have been on her back for a myriad of reasons--during a vaginal
examination, while sleeping, during a routine pre-natal
examination, while her blood pressure was being taken, for induc·
tion of labor and for many other purposes.
Since being left on her back too long is the thrust of
plaintiffs' claim of negligence, the reason for putting her on
her back can have nothing to do with causing the arrest, even if
the amniocentesis was unnecessary or contraindicated.
If doing the amniocentesis at 38 weeks, whether· it was
contraindicated or not, had nothing to do with causing the
arrest, how can the failure to do prior titers and amniocentesis,
even if they should have been done, have anything to do with the
real issue in this case; namely, was Mrs. Reiser left on her back
too long, and did that cause the cardiac arrest?
Plaintiffs argue that this particular amniocentesis
should not have been performed and that labor should have been
induced because of the unavailability of data from omitted
earlier tests.

(Plaintiffs' Brief, p. 13-14, R. 1073)

If labor

had been induced, Mrs. Reiser would have been put on her back for
that reason, which according to plaintiff was medically indicat~
and in accordance with good medical practice.

Had this been ~M
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...

and Mrs. Reiser developed a cardiac arrest because of being left
on her back too long, plaintiffs would be claiming negligence,
not because of the reason she was placed on her back, i.e. to
induce labor, but because she was left there too long.
The reason for placing Mrs. Reiser on her back whether
performing a medically indicated procedure--induction of labor-or a procedure that was not medically indicated-- amniocentesis
at 38 weeks--is immaterial.

In either case they are simply con-

ditions by which plaintiffs' claim of injury was possible through
later intervening circumstances.
In Hunt v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 448 P.2d 1018
(Okla. 1968), the plaintiff contended that certain defects were
present in a tire manufactured by the defendant, such that those
defects constituted a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries
that he suffered from an automobile accident some 8,000 miles
after the tire was sold.

The court, in holding for the

defendant, stated:
It is our op1n1on that the scratches or
cuts upon the side of the tire merely
constituted a condition by which an
injury was possible ••..

* * *

The proximate cause of any injury must be
the efficient cause which sets in motion
the chain of circumstances leading to the
injuries; if the negligence complained of
merely furnished a condition by which the
injury was possible and a subsequent
independent act caused the injury, the
existence of such condition is not the
proximate cause of the injury. 448 P.2d
at 1023.
See also Stevenson v. Kansas City, 360 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1961), and
Girard v. Monrovia City School District, 264 P.2d 115 (Cal. App.
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1953).
3.

The Injury To Plaintiff Was Not Reasonably

Foreseeable.
One further reason why the omitted tests in the instant
case cannot be a "proximate cause" of plaintiff's injuries is
that any intervening act in the chain of causation that is not
"reasonably foreseeable" will supersede and cut off the chain
causation.

~

Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th Ed., p. 272; Hillyard v.

Utah By-Products Co., 1 Utah 2d 143, 149-151.
It is undisputed from all of the testimony in this case
that a cardiac arrest has never in medical history resulted
an amniocentesis procedure.

(R.

1412)

fr~

Further, it is undisputed'

that never in medical history has it been reported that a woman

~

in the late stages of pregnancy and who has not been given a
regional anesthesia suffered from supine hypotensive syndrome
that went on to develop into a cardiac arrest.

Plaintiffs'

expert witness Dr. Edward Banner testified on that issue as
follows:
Q. Now, Doctor, in your experience,
have you ever had a lady in late
pregnancy -- have you ever known of one
that you have been taking care of to
develop this supine hypotension syndrome
and then have it go on to a cardiac
arrest?
A.

Never.

Q. Have you ever heard of a cardiac
arrest resulting following an
amniocentesis?
A.

No, sir, I haven't.

* * *
Q.

Have you in discussing with your
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....

collea~ues ever heard of a cardiac arrest

resulting from a supine hypotension
syndrome?
A.

I have not, sir.

* * *
Q. H~ve yo~ ever read about in any
of the medical literature anything about
a pregnant lady in the late stages of
pregnancy developing supine hypotension
syndrome and having that go on to a cardiac arrest?

A.

No, sir.

* * *
Q.
(By Mr. Hanni) Is it fair to
say then, Doctor, that if you are right
in what you believe the cause of Mrs.
Reiser's cardiac arrest is, is it fair to
say so far as you know either from your
own experience, from talking to your
colleagues, from reading the medical
literature, that this is the first time
that a cardiac arrest has been caused or
has followed a supine hypotension
syndrome?

A. Yes, that's true.
(R. 1412-1414)
(See also testimony of other expert witnesses,
R. 1364-1369, 1685-1687, 1812)
It appears therefore that the causal connection relied
on by plaintiff has never before occurred in medical history.
Consequently, it is difficult to see how the defendants can be
held to the duty to foresee or anticipate this chain of events.
The evidence is clear that defendants did not expose Mrs. Reiser
to an unreasonable risk of harm by placing her on her back for an
amniocentesis procedure at 38 weeks, whether or not that procedure was contraindicated by reason of the earlier test omissions.
Mrs.

Reiser had been on her back on numerous times before for

other standard office procedures, and would often wake up at
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night finding herself having fallen asleep on her back during her
pregnancies, and like millions of pregnant women throughout the
world, she had never suffered from supine hypotensive syndrome or
a cardiac arrest or any other physical problem.

(R. 219)

It is,

therefore, difficult to see how the outcome of the instant case
could have been "reasonably foreseen" by the defendants.
Plaintiffs argue that one of the explanations offered by
an expert witness for defendants as to the cause of the

cardi~

arrest supports the causal connection between the failure to perform the earlier titers and amniocenteses and the injury to the
infant plaintiff.

Defendants' expert witnesses and the

defendants, themselves, testified that there were various

mech~

nisms that possibly could have caused the cardiac arrest
including a reaction to the local anesthetic, (R. 1291, 1676),
an amniotic fluid embolism, (R. 1677, 1814), and a vaso vagal
reflex, (R. 1299, 1565, 1684, 1810).
Physicians at the trial also testified, however, that
individuals with perfectly normal hearts can suddenly have a car·
diac arrest for no explained reason.

(R.

1067, 813)

Whatever the cause of the arrest, the evidence also
demonstrated that the injury to plaintiff was unforeseeable and
totally unexpected from an amniocentesis.

(R. 1291, 1298, 1811,

1814)
4.

The End Result Would Have Been The Same.

Defendants contend that the amniocentesis would have
been performed at or about 38 weeks even if the earlier tests had
been taken.

Consequently the end result would have been the

same, which is an additional reason why the omissions cannot be a
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proximate cause of the injuries.
Any earlier titer tests would simply have measured the
level of sensitivity in the mother, but would not measure the
status of the baby (R. 1311-1333, 1429, 1510-1511).

Any earlier

amniocentesis procedures would simply have assessed the status of
the infant at the time the test was performed, and the infant's
condition cannot improve as the pregnancy continues.
The amniocentesis test result on the 38th week in the
instant case revealed that the infant was not severely involved
with the Rh factor.

(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 6; First Transcript of

Proceedings, p. 647}

The infant could very well have stayed in

the womb for another week or two beyond 38 weeks until conditions
were more favorable for induction of labor or until spontaneous
delivery occurred.
576, 717}

(First Transcript of Proceedings, p. 120-121,

Consequently, if the baby was not severely enough

involved to take it out of the uterus environment or to be given
a blood exchange transfusion at 38 weeks, the same result would
have been present at 20 or 25 weeks pregnancy, and a further
amniocentesis would have been necessary around the 38th week.
Therefore, the earlier tests would not have changed the fact that
the amniocentesis would have been performed anyway at or about
the 38th week, and presumably the cardiac arrest would still have
occurred which led to the brain damage.

Plaintiffs do not seem

to contest this fact, but simply state that this particular
amniocentesis should not have been performed and that labor
should have been induced because of the unavailability of data
from omitted earlier tests.

(Plaintiff's Brief, P· 13-14;
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R. 1073)
The same kind of situation was encountered in

Dickin~

v. Mason, 18 Utah 2d 383, 423 P.2d 663 (1967), wherein the

infa~

plaintiff sustained a severe laceration on his right index

fi~H

and he was treated by defendant.

Defendant bandaged the finger

and four or five days later the bandage was removed by another
doctor and it was discovered that the finger was black, without
feeling or sensation, and an amputation of the finger was
performed.

Plaintiff alleged that defendant applied the

banda~

so tightly that it cut off the circulation and resulted in
gangrene setting in.

At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence

the trial court granted defendant's motion for an involuntary
dismissal and on appeal the Supreme Court affirmed on the basis
that the negligent acts complained of did not proximately cause
the ultimate result of amputation.

As support for their holding,

the court referred to the testimony of plaintiff's own expert
witness, who testified that in spite of the acts of defendant the
end result would have been identical and that the hand would have
been the same "as we now find it".
In the instant case plaintiffs refer to certain
omissions that were below the standard of care of a practicing
physician, but as noted in Dickinson, such errors or omissions
can only lead to liability and recovery when they are a proximaU
cause of the plaintiff's injuries.

In the instant case, whe~M

the defendants would have performed the earlier tests or not, the
end result would have been the same.

See also Paull v. Zions

First National Bank, 18 Utah 2d 183, 117 P.2d 759 (1966); Bonn!!
v. Conklin, 62 F.2d 875 (D.C.Cir. 1932); and ~W~r~i~g~h~t~v~·__::;C~l~em_e_ll__t,
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190 N.E. 11 (Mass. 1934).
B.

Evidence That A Titer Test Was Not Taken And That

~Amniocentesis

Was Not Performed Prior To June 26, 1971, would

Be Highly And Unfairly Prejudicial Against The Defendants.
Assuming arguendo that the evidence of the failure to
perform prior titers and amniocentesis procedures has some relevance or materiality to the issues of this lawsuit, any relevance
or probative value can only be minimal when weighed against the
prejudicial effects of such evidence.

Because of the slight pro-

bative value and highly prejudicial nature of the evidence, the
trial court judge excluded the evidence by way of an order in
limine pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
1.

Evidence Can Be Excluded Under Rule 45 (U.R.E.)

Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides as
follows:
Rule 45. Discretion of judge to exclude
admissible evidence.
Except as in these rules otherwise
provided, the judge may in his discretion
exclude evidence if he finds that its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk that its admission
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of
time, or (b) create substantial danger of
undue prejudice or of confusing the
issues or of misleading the jury, or (c)
unfairly and harmfully surprise a party
who has not had reasonable opportunity to
anticipate that such evidence would be
offered.
The Rule clearly states that the decision of whether to
exclude evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial
court, and the supreme court of the state of Utah has recognized
time and again that the trial court should be accorded a large
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measure of discretion in this regard and should be reversed only
when there is a clear abuse of that discretion, Martin v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1977), State v.
Minnish, 560 P.2d 340 (Utah 1977).
Plaintiffs repeatedly argue that the failure of the
defendants to take titer tests and to perform amniocentesis pro·
cedures prior to June 26, 1971, was not in conformity with the
recognized standard of care in the treatment of the Rh factor
pregnant women.

~

Assuming that such omissions were negligence,

the probative value of the defendants' neglect in that instance
is non-existent.

However, if the jury is allowed to hear evi-

dence of one area of neglect in treating the plaintiff's mother,
Eleanor Reiser, it would be highly prejudicial to the defendants,
At the time that Judge Sawaya considered defendants'
Motion in Limine prior to the second trial of this case, he had
before him the transcript of proceedings in the original trial
held in November of 1977.

Even a cursory examination of the

transcript of proceedings in that first trial illustrated how
often plaintiffs' counsel attempted to get before the jury the
evidence of the failure to perform the earlier tests in spite cl
the court's ruling at the beginning of the trial that such evi·
dence was to be excluded.

As part of the Memorandum in support

of defendants' Motion in Limine, defendants cited for Judge
Sawaya several parts of the original transcript of proceedings
illustrating the various ways plaintiffs' counsel attempted to
present these omissions to the jury.

The Memorandum submitted

to

the court containing the quoted passages from the transcript ue
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part of this record on appeal.

(R. 313-316)

Based on what happened at the first trial, defendants'
counsel filed a Motion in Limine weeks in advance of the second
trial and obtained an Order in Limine in writing requiring
plaintiffs' counsel to refrain from bringing up the issue.
In spite of the ruling in limine, plaintiffs were able
to present all relevant evidence as to the theories of negligence
that allegedly brought about the injuries to the infant
plaintiff.
However, Judge Sawaya held firm on his decision not to
allow the evidence of the failure to perform the earlier titer
and amniocentesis procedures.

At one point in the trial, the

court made it clear as to the basis for his ruling:
THE COURT: I've already made a
ruling in this matter and there is no
point in debating it every time we come
into Court or call a witness. It seems to
me it's clear in my mind and I appreciate
that we each have a different opinion
about what this case is all about but I
have already made a ruling on the issue
and that is that evidence of the failure
to take a prior titer and a prior
amniocentesis is not proper evidence
because of causation and I agree with
defense counsel that letting it in would
create a greater risk that this Jury
would return a verdict on the basis of
that act of negligence than the one that
actually caused the injury.
Now, it seems to me that this
constant haranguing about it and constant
argument about it isn't going to make it
any different than it was back at the
beginning.
Plaintiffs correctly point out in their Brief that there
is a distinct similarity between Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence and Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

A review
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of federal cases interpreting Rule 403 illustrates the numerous
instances when highly prejudicial evidence was excluded from the
jury.

Yellow Bayou
Plantation,- Inc. v. Shell Chemical I Inc '
-

491

I

F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1974), Kilarjian v. Horvath, 379 F.2d 547
(2nd Cir.

1967); Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332 (5th

Cir. 1978); Harless v. Boyle-Midway Div., American Home

Produ~,

594 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1979).
2.

A Motion In Limine Was The Proper Way To Exclude The

Evidence Because Of The Highly Prejudicial Effect.
The value of a motion in limine to exclude prejudicial
evidence prior to trial is seen in the case of Troxel v. Otto,
287 N.E. 2d 791 (Ind. 1972).

The plaintiff had brought an actioo

against the husband of the deceased defendant for injuries
arising out of an automobile accident.

The defendant died from

injuries suffered in a subsequent unrelated accident.

At the

trial plaintiff's attorney mentioned the subsequent automobile
accident on several occasions to the jury as "one more instance .
• • of her (defendant) not looking."

The appellate court

referred to the remarks of counsel as matters that he sought
be thrust into the lawsuit that were prejudicial.

~

In its

opinion, the court noted how the defendant's attorney could have
prevented these remarks of counsel by a motion before trial:
Alert counsel, however, may protect himself against possible misconduct by means
of a pre-trial order determining admissibility whenever his trial preparations
discloses evidence of a highly prejudicial nature which may or may not be
admissible. Protective orders might conversely serve as a firm and advance admonition to counsel not to embark upon a
path which might lead to a mistrial or
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re~e7sa1 7
Such pre-trial preparation and
ut1l1zat1on of the available procedures
is to be encouraged. 287 N.E.2d at 794.

The number of times that plaintiffs' counsel in the
instant case at the first trial asked questions of witnesses concerning the failure to perform the earlier tests and the constant
objections and requests to approach the bench by defense counsel
clearly illustrates the need for an order in limine rather than
to attempt to cure the problem as the questions were asked.
Judge Sawaya could see the danger in attempting to exclude this
kind of evidence as the questions are asked and the relative
ineffectiveness of asking the jury to disregard the questions
each time they are asked.

In 63 A.L.R.3d 311, 313, the author

states:
It is commonly understood by trial
lawyers that prejudice implanted or stimulated in the minds of jurors can win
trials, but objecting to the prejudicial
material may only emphasize it, and that
traditional 'curative' actions taken by
trial judges when prejudicial material is
objected to are ineffective and
unrealistic and may aggravate the potential harm.
A motion in limine in the instant case was therefore a
proper procedure to exclude the irrelevant or minimally probative
evidence of a failure to perform earlier titers and amniocentesis
procedures, when such evidence would be highly and unfairly prejudicial against the defendants.
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POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN
SUBMITTING A SPECIAL VERDICT TO THE JURY
AND THE VERDICT FORM SUBMITTED DID
ADEQUATELY ALLOW THE JURY TO CONSIDER THE
PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF THE CASE.
As noted in plaintiff's brief, the trial court submitted
a special verdict form to the jury, requiring the jury to answu
special interrogatories, rather than having the jury respond to
general verdict.
five questions:

The special verdict form asked the following
(1)

Was defendant, Richard Lehner, negligent h

allowing Mrs. Reiser to lie on her back for an excessive
of time?

(2)

a

peri~

If your answer to no. 1 is yes, was such negli-

gence a proximate cause of the injury or damage to the plaintiffl
(3)

Was the defendant Richard Lehner negligent in the acts and

efforts utilized or not utilized to resuscitate Mrs. Reiser
during the time she was unconscious?

(4)

If your answer to no.

3 is yes, was such negligence a proximate cause of the injury or
damage to the plaintiff?

(5)

If your answers to questions 1 and

2 are yes or to questions 3 and 4 are yes or the answer to all cl
the above questions are yes, then you are to answer the following
question:

What are the plaintiff's damages?
The jury returned a verdict to the court answering

questions 1 and 3 "no", and having answered in that manner the
other questions were not to be answered by the jury.
Rule 49(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows
the trial court the option to have the jury complete a "specitl
verdict".

The rule states in part:
The court may require a jury to return
only a special verdict in the form of a
special written finding upon each issue
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o~ fact.
In that event the court may subm1 t to the jury written interrogatories
susceptible of categorical or other brief
answer or may submit writtern forms of
the several special findings which might
properly be made under the pleadings and
evidence; or it may use such other method
of submitting the issues and requiring
the written findings thereon as it deems
most appropriate.

The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that the
decision of whether to submit the case on a "special verdict" is
one for the sound discretion of the trial court, Cooper v. Evans,
l Utah 2d 68, 262 P.2d 278 (1953); Milligan v. Capitol Furniture,
8 Utah 2d 383, 335 P.2d 619

(1959); Page v. Utah Home Fire Insurance

Company, 15 Utah 2d 257, 391 P.2d 290 (1964); and Ewell & Son,
Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 27 Utah 2d 188, 493 P.2d 1283
(1972).

Further, in Hanks v. Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d

564 (1960), this court held that:

"It is elementary that there

is no impropriety in submitting special interrogatories if the
court so desires."
In plaintiff's brief the case of Barton v. Jensen, 19
Utah 2d 196, 429 P.2d 44 (1967), is cited as authority for the
concept that a special verdict form which eliminates certain
theories of plaintiff's case or severely restricts the issues
upon which the jury can make a finding would constitute a clear
abuse of discretion on the trial court.

However, Barton stands

merely for the concept that the court went beyond what is ordinarily considered as "polling the jury" and that as a result of
the questioning in open court by the judge, some of the jury members may have changed their opinion as to the merits of the
cause.
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As grounds for their statement that the submission of a
special verdict was error, plaintiffs argue that several theories
of negligence were not allowed to be considered by the jury.
An understanding of plaintiffs' overall theories of negligence
and causation, however, which were presented to the jury by
questions 1 through 4 of the verdict form, reveals that every one
of the claimed allegations of negligence which plaintiff
indicates were not submitted to the jury, were in fact presented
and encompassed within the verdict form.

For example, the alle-

gation of the failure of the doctor and nurses to properly attend
to Mrs. Reiser, the allegation of the failure to monitor
Mrs. Resier, and the allegation of the failure on the part of the
doctor to adequately train his nursing staff to recognize the
symptoms of supine hypotensive syndrome, are all encompassed in
the question of whether Dr. Lobner was negligent in allowing
Mrs. Reiser to lie on her back for an excessive period of time.
Each of the stated allegations of negligence referred to by
plaintiffs suggest that if the doctor was at all times doing what
he should have done, Mrs. Reiser would not have been allowed to
lie on her back for an excessive period of time.
Further, the allegations of failing to have oxygen

~r

sent and failing to have the nurses participate in the resuscita·
tive efforts are each incorporated in the general question of,
"Was the defendant Richard Lobner negligent in the acts and
efforts utilized or not utilized to resuscitate Mrs. Reiser
during the time she was unconscious?"

The implication of not

having oxygen present and not having the nurses participate in
the resuscitative efforts simply goes to the question of whether
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the acts and efforts utilized by Dr. Lehner were what they should
have been given the standard of care.
Plaintiffs further argue in their brief that they were
precluded from presenting the issue that defendants were negligent in "failing to induce labor when they obtained the initial.
titer of 1:128."

Plaintiffs fail to point out, however, that

plaintiffs' counsel agreed and indicated to the court that the
issue of failing to induce labor rather than perform an amniocentesis at 38 weeks should not go to the jury.
In the very beginning of the trial plaintiffs' counsel
stated that in light of the court's order in limine plaintiffs
would not present the issue of the failure to induce labor.

In

fact, plaintiffs' counsel specifically told the court that he was
not going to argue that doing the amniocentesis at 38 weeks
rather than inducing labor was a negligent act:
THE COURT: But are you going to argue
that doing it at thirty-eight weeks was a
negligent act?
MR. HOWARD: No. I'm going to argue
having her on her back at thirty-eight
weeks for any operation, any procedure
was negligence.
THE COURT: If you are not going to claim
that doing it at that period of her
pregnancy was an act of negligence then I
don't see any point of raising it.
MR. HOWARD: Not the amniocentesis. Any
procedure. If he had had her on her back
to take her temperature and had her there
for eight minutes, it would have b7en
negligence. This is under the ruling of
this Court.
(R. 1094)
In spite of the above representation, plaintiffs' counsel in opening statement and through testimony of expert witSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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..,
nesses did refer to the failure to induce labor rather than Per.
form an amniocentesis as negligence.

The court later in the

trial inquired of plaintiffs' counsel whether there was an

iss~

that the doing of the amniocentesis in this particular case was
negligence, and after plaintiffs' counsel reported that was
an issue, the court removed it from the jury.

n~

Part of the

dialogue between the court and counsel in that regard is as
follows:
THE COURT: The question is whether or
not it was negligent to have her on her
back -MR. HOWARD:

That's right.

THE COURT: (continuing) -- for an
extended period of time.
I'll submit that as a special interrogatory but I will not submit as a special
interrogatory the question of whether or
not it was negligent to perform an
amniocentesis at thirty-eight weeks.
MR. HOWARD: I'll agree. That's perfectly all right.
(R. 1487-1488)
In light of the representations of plaintiffs' counsel,
it would appear that plaintiffs waived any right to have this
issue presented to the jury, in effect agreeing that the

givi~

of an amniocentesis rather than inducing labor at 38 weeks was
not part of plaintiffs' theory of the case, which simply related
to whether the defendants had left the patient on her back fm u
excessive period of time, for whatever reason.

The reason she

was on her back was not related to the injury as has been
thoroughly discussed earlier.
From all of the foregoing it appears that the special
verdict
form submitted adequately covered the theories of negli·
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gence that the plaintiff presented and the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in failing to submit a general verdict form.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN
FAILING TO GIVE TO THE JURY THE ISSUE OF
INFORMED CONSENT.
Plaintiffs argue in their brief that nbecause of the
ruling of the court on the motion in limine, plaintiffs were
precluded from having their medical experts testify that the
doctor's alleged mismanagement and failure to take timely tests
would be an essential part of any informed consent."

Plaintiffs

further state that because of the motion in limine the court was
forced to reject plaintiffs' requested instruction on informed
consent, "even though the court recognized that there was an
issue on informed consent."

(Plaintiffs' Brief, p. 37)

The truth of the matter is that the court never
recognized that there was an issue on informed consent with or
without the order in limine.

The record clearly reveals this:

THE COURT: I can't see this problem, I'm
sorry, no matter how you argue it.
Informed consent. Okay. She should have
been told there was risk involved in the
procedure she underwent on June 26th.
Beyond that, why would she have to be
told they were doing it because they
didn't do it on prior occasions? That
doesn't make any sense to me at all.
Informed consent simply means that she
has to know all the risks involved in the
procedure she is about to undertake.
Now, having failed to do prior procedures
has nothing to do with whether or not she
is informed of what's going to happen
with this procedure.
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A.

Defendant's Duty To Obtain An Informed Consent

Extends Only To Informing The Patient Of Substantial, And
Significant, Risks.
In plaintiffs' jury instruction requesting the issue of
"informed consent", plaintiffs recognize that the defendants must
inform the patient of the "risks involved in the procedure
performed".

(R. 192)

(Emphasis added)

This duty is further defined by the recent Utah

sta~b

which, although not applicable directly because the statute was
not in effect in 1971, is still very instructive on the kind of
information that is considered necessary to disclose to a
patient.

O.C.A. §78-14-5, as it became effective in 1976,

requires that the physician need only inform the patient of the
"substantial" and •significant" risks of the procedure to be
performed.
The procedure performed in the instant case was an
amniocentesis which carried certain minor risks, including
sticking the baby with a needle and infection.
Plaintiffs cannot and do not contend that the failure to
perform prior amniocentesis procedures or prior titer tests were
in any way a risk associated with the performance of the
amniocentesis at 38 weeks.

Plaintiffs' only argument for

claiming error on the issue of informed consent is that the
omission of the earlier tests was information that should have
been supplied to the patient, Mrs. Reiser, in deciding whether to
have the amniocentesis performed at the 38th week.

This does not

appear to be the kind of information that is necessary to obtain
an informed consent under Utah law.

See also Ficklin v.
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Macfarlane, 550 P.2d 1295 (Utah 1976).
The injury received by the infant plaintiff in the
instant case was a result of "anoxia", which is the condition
caused by the cardiac arrest suffered by Mrs. Reiser after the
amniocentesis procedure was performed.

Plaintiffs cannot and do

not contend that the possibility of obtaining a cardiac arrest
from the amniocentesis procedure was a risk that should have been
explained to her.

All of the evidence at the trial confirmed the

fact that a cardiac arrest has never resulted from an amniocentesis procedure before and that a cardiac arrest has never
resulted from the condition known as supine hypotensive syndrome,
which plaintiffs claim brought about the cardiac arrest.
(R. 1364-1369, 1412-1414, 1685-1687, 1812)
Dr. Lehner testified that he did inform Mrs. Reiser of
the major risks associated with the giving of the amniocentesis,
including striking the baby with the needle and infection.
B.

(R. 1518)

Any Failure To Inform Mrs. Reiser Of The Omission Of

The Earlier Tests Or Of The Risks Of Performing An Amniocentesis
Cannot Be A Proximate Cause Of Plaintiff's Injuries.
Any failure to inform Mrs. Reiser of test omissions cannot be a proximate cause of the injuries to the Reiser baby.

The

infant was not injured as a result of the Rh factor or a breakdown of the infant's blood from the attack of the mother's
antibodies.

This has been thoroughly discussed in Point I of

this brief.
It is a well-settled principle that the physician's
failure to adequately inform must be a proximate cause of the
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damage to the patient in order to hold defendants liable.
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790; Wales v. Barnes, 261
So. 2d 201 (Fla.App. 1972); Vara v. Drago, 264 N. Y. s. 2d 660

(N.Y,

1965), U.C.A. §78-14-5(1) (g), and plaintiffs' requested jury
instructions (R. 192).
It is interesting to note that the plaintiffs cite the
case of Gates v. Jensen, 595 P.2d 919 (Wash. 1979), as a case
where the doctrine of informed consent has been recently "well
stated".

Gates is clearly distinguishable, however, from the

instant case on the issue of causation, in that the problem deve·
loping from the lack of information given to the patient was
directly related to the actual injury ultimately received.

In

the instant case, however, and as has been noted again and again,
the infant plaintiff's

injuri~s

had nothing to do with the Rh

factor and a failure to perform the earlier tests and acquaint
Mrs. Reiser with that failure was simply not a cause of the
injuries.
The causal relationship is also missing in any claim
that Dr. Lobner did not inform Mrs. Reiser of the usual and
expected risks of an amniocentesis.

The baby was not injured as

a result of a needle striking it or from infection introduced
into the amniotic cavity.

There is no contention by plaintiffs

that there are any other usual and expected risks of an
amniocentesis.
C.

Husband Consent Not Required For The Performance..21

An Amniocentesis.
Plaintiffs argue that the infant plaintiff's father,
Richard Reiser, should have been consulted concerning the
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amniocentesis procedure.

Plaintiffs have incorrectly cited Hope

v. Nielsen, 523 P.2d 211 (Wash. 1974), as authority for the proposition that a physician must have an informed consent from both
parents for a procedure affecting an unborn fetus.
brief, p. 40)

(Plaintiff• s

In that case, the court simply required an

informed consent from the "parents" concerning a cesarean
section, but did not discuss the right of the "father" and the
"mother" both to give such an informed consent.
The Utah informed consent statute addresses this subject
more directly and specifies the individual who has the right to
give the "informed consent" in a situation involving a pregnancy:
(4) The following persons are authorized
and empowered to consent to any health
care not prohibited by law:

* * *

(f) Any female regardless of her age
or marital status, when given in connection with her pregnancy or childbirth.
U.C.A. §78-14-5 (4) (f).
A case directly on point from the Second District Court
of Appeals in California is Rosenburg v. Feigin, 260 P.2d 143
(Cal.App. 1953), wherein the plaintiff was a husband of a patient
treated by defendant during the course of her pregnancy, and
plaintiff contended that he did not give consent to the
defendant's treatment, which amounted to malpractice, and
resulted in a miscarriage.

In affirming the judgment of

dismissal against the husband, the court stated:
The defendant as physician for the wife
of plaintiff had a right and duty to give
her the care and treatment that she
required and consented to, according to
accepted standards of his profession, and
is not liable to the husband because he
did not notify the husband of the nature
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and possible effect of the care which he
contemplated and regarded as necessary,
and did not secure the huband's consent.
260 P.2d at 144.
See also Nishi v. Hartwell, 473 P.2d 116 (Haw. 1970).
Based on all the foregoing, it appears clear that the
trial court did not err in failing to present the issue of
informed consent to the jury.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN
DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' FIRST CAUSE OF
ACTION BY REASON OF THE EXPIRATION OF THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
On January 23, 1976, Judge Allen B. Sorensen granted a
summary judgment against plaintiff Eleanor Reiser upon the first
cause. of action of plaintiffs' complaint.

(R. 762-763)

The

Minute Entry and Ruling of January 16, 1976, of Judge Sorensen
indicates that the first cause of action was barred by reason of
the expiration of the statute of limitations, 78-12-28(3),
U.C.A., (1953).
A.

A Separate Trial On The Applicability Of The Statut1

Of Limitations Is Not Required When There Is No Dispute Of The
Applicable Facts.
Plaintiffs argue that Utah Code Annotated §78-12-47 (~
effect at the time) is a party's right to have the statute of
limitations issue in a medical malpractice case tried by a jury.
Plaintiffs' argument, in effect, would deny a trial court from
granting a summary judgment on the basis of the expiration of
medical malpractice statute of limitations.

thi

The statute cit~.

however, does not extend to the limits implied by plaintiffs'
argument.

· e1
Section 78-12-47 states merely that, "the issue rais
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thereby may be tried separately before any other issues in the
case are tried."

(Emphasis added)

It does not state that the

limitations issue must be tried in a separate action and the statute on its face does not take from the trial court the prerogative to dismiss a claim on the basis that there are no material
issues of fact concerning the expiration of the statute of
limitations.
The authority of a trial court to grant a summary
judgment when there is no substantial issue of fact involved on
the issue of the statute of limitations is well settled.

51

Am.Jur.2d, Limitation of Actions, 927 §470, 61 A.L.R.2d 341, 342.
Judge Sorensen correctly determined that there was no
triable issue of fact as to the expiration of the statute of
limitations by virtue of the extensive deposition testimony cited
in defendants' memorandum in support of the motion for summary
judgment.

(R. 822-827)
B.

Plaintiff Eleanor Reiser Filed Her Lawsuit Two Years

After The Date That She Discovered Her Injury Or Through The Use
Of Reasonable Diligence Should Have Discovered Her Injury And Her
Cause Of Action was Therefore Barred Under The Provisions Of
U.C.A. §78-12-28 (3).
The applicable statute of limitations for medical
malpractice actions in effect at the time plaintiffs filed this
matter was u.c.A. §78-12-28(3) which stated that an action
against a physician must be filed "two years after the date of
injury or two years after the plaintiff discovers, or through the
use of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the injury,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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---

Since plaintiffs filed their lawsuit on May 1, 1974, thi
foregoing statute would require that plaintiff Eleanor Reiser
must have discovered her injury after May 1, 1972, in order for
the cause of action to be valid.
Numerous testimony from the depositions of plaintiff

Eleanor Reiser and plaintiff Richard Reiser, as well as physiciai
treating Mrs. Reiser, is cited in the memorandum in support of
defendants' motion for summary judgment.

(R. 823-827)

All of

this testimony clearly revealed that Mrs. Reiser experienced

memory, balance, and visual problems almost immediately after th1
cardiac arrest which she experienced on June 26, 1971.
The Utah Supreme Court has recently announced the
opinion of Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (1979), wherein the
court held that the statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims begins to run, "when an injured person knows or
should know that he has suffered a legal injury."

601 P.2d at

147.
There are several distinguishing features between the
instant case and Foil, which would suggest a different result
from that obtained in the Foil decision.

In Foil, the plaintiff

originally sustained a back injury in May of 1967.

She was

treated with good results and was gainfully employed until
December, 1971, when she again injured her back.
performed additional surgery.

A surgeon then

Because of continued back pain,

plaintiff was given injections of caudal anesthesia as well as
various medications and subcutaneous electrical stimulation, froi
November 30th to December 15, 1973.

She was then later read-

mitted to the hospital on January 18, 1974, and received a
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"subarachnoid phenol block."
Plaintiff next suffered from

a rectal and bladder

disorder resulting in major surgery in December, 1975.

Her

health problems persisted, and she eventually received a report
from the Workmen's Compensation Medical Panel indicating that the
rectal and bladder problems resulted from the causative agents
of the "block" administered in January of 1974.

It was at that

point that the court held plaintiff Foil had discovered her
"legal injury."
In Foil, one can plainly see that it would have been
difficult for plaintiff to have established any causal relationship between the treatment of the defendant physician who
administered the "block" and the rectal and bladder disorder.
This subsequent problem could have been totally unrelated to any
medical treatment received, and by the time defendant had treated
plaintiff, she had already received so much medical attention
that it would have been difficult to isolate any specific act
that could have been negligence.
In the instant case, however, there is no question but
that plaintiff Eleanor Reiser experienced loss of memory, balance
and visual problems that she was told was a direct result of the
cardiac arrest.

(R. 823-827)

Consequently, if plaintiff had a

claim for malpractice that was incident to the cardiac arrest,
the only medical treatment to suspect would be that given by Dr.
Lehner on June 26, 1971.

with that in mind, it is incumbent upon

Plaintiff to exercise the reasonable diligence to discover
whether there may have been any negligence.

Plaintiff cannot sit
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by and wait until someone tells them there may be malpractice
before the time commences for the applicable statute of
limitations.

This relationship of the responsibility of the

plaintiff to make reasonable inquiry with the running of the
discovery statute of limitations in a medical malpractice
is required by many courts throughout the country.
Santa Monica Hospital, 9 Cal. Reptr.

acti~

In Mock v.

555 (1960), the court

affirmed a summary dismissal of plaintiff's case stating:
This brings into play the rule so frequently announced in this state that as
the means of knowledge are equivalent to
knowledge, if it appears that the plaintiff had notice or information of circumstances which would put him on an
inquiry which, if followed, would lead to
knowledge, or that the facts were presumptively within his knowledge, he will
be deemed to have had actual knowledge of
these facts. 9 Cal. Reptr. at 561-62.
See also Hemingway v. Waxler, 274 P.2d 699 (Cal. 1954).
Defendants contend that this standard should apply to
malpractice actions of the kind involved in this case and that
based on the amount of knowledge that Mrs. Reiser had of her
"injury" that the trial court summary judgment should be
affirmed.
POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN
DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' THIRD CAUSE OF
ACTION BECAUSE THE CLAIM FOR EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS DOES NOT STATE A CLAIM UPON
WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED.
Plaintiff's third cause of action of their complaint
alleged "emotional damage" by reason of the injuries to their
daughter. (R. 930)

The trial court dismissed this cause of

action by summary judgment for the reason that such a cause of
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action is not recognized in Utah.

In so ruling, the trial court

correctly held that Utah has not extended recovery for negligent
infliction of emotional distress.
In Jeppsen v. Jensen, 47 Utah 536, 155 P. 429 (1916),
and Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961), both of
which were cases involving "intentional" infliction of emotional
distress, the Supreme court specifically stated that emotional
damages could not be recovered for mere negligence.

In Samms,

the court stated:
Our study of the authorities, and of the
arguments advanced, convinces us, that
conceding such a cause of action, may not
be based upon mere negligence, the best
considered view recognizes an action for
severe emotional distress, though not
accompanied by bodily impact or physical
injury, where the defendant intentionally
engaged in some conduct toward the
plaintiff. • • • (Emphasis added)
358 P.2d at 346-47.
In Preece v. Baur, 143 F.Supp. 804 (E.D. Idaho 1956),
the U.S. District Court in the Eastern District of Idaho applied
Utah law in holding that a parent could not recover for mental
distress or anxiety when his child had been put in peril by the
negligence of a third party.
This is the general rule that is supported throughout
the country, as is articulated in 32 A.L.R.2d 1078, §7:
The rule has been recognized in a number
of later cases that there can be no
recovery by a parent in an action for
injuries to a minor child, for the pain,
suffering, or other distress caused the
parent by the injuries of the child.
The exception to this general rule that has been adopted
in some jurisdictions would permit recovery for emotional
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distress when such distress results in physical injury to the
plaintiff and where the plaintiff is either within the "zone

~

danger" or where there has been contemporaneous observance of a
sudden and immediate injury to a close member of the plaintiff's
family.

Dillon v. Legg, 69 Cal. Reptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968),

77 A.L.R.3d 447.
The landmark decision of Dillon v. Legg, supra, from the
California Supreme Court clearly did not extend recovery for emo·
tional distress to parents in situations like the instant case
where the injury to the child was not a result of a "single
traumatic incident", and where the emotional distress to the
parents caused by the injury to the child did not result in
actual physical injury to the parents.

In the later California

decision of Capelouto v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 98 Cal.
Reptr. 631 (1971), aff'd 103 Cal. Reptr. 856, 500 P.2d 880
(1972), the parents were attempting to recover for emotional
distress caused as a result of a salmonella bacteria infection
transferred to their infant daughter as a result of
the hospital where the infant was born.

negligence~

Symptoms of the

daughter's disease lasted off and on over a period of 9 to 12
months.

In rejecting any recovery for emotional distress, the

Appellate Court stated:
We believe Dillon does not apply to the
circumstances of the case at bench.
Dillon involved a single traumatic
accident, observable and contemporaneously observed. Here the
'accident' was the unobservable
transmission of an infection, and the
shock came only from viewing the lengthy
unfolding of the symptoms of the
infection.
Moreover,
Dillon
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to a case in which the shock resulted in
physical injury. 98 Cal.Rptr. at 635.
(The California Supreme Court in this same case affirmed the fact
that Dillon did not extend to mental distress that does not
result in physical injury, 500 P.2d 800, 882, footnote 1.)
In the recent case of Keck v. Jackson, 593 P.2d 668
(Ariz. 1979), the Arizona Supreme Court held that evidence of
physical injury would be required resulting from emotional
distress in order to provide recovery to the parents.

The court

reasoned as follows:
In order for there to be recovery for the
tort of negligent infliction of emotional
distress, the shock or mental anguish of
the plaintiff must be manifested as a
physical injury. Damages for emotional
disturbance alone are too speculative.
593 P.2d at 669-670.
For other recent cases requiring the allegations of actual physical injury resulting from claims of emotional distress, see
Aragon v. Spellman, 491 P.2d 173 (N.M. 1971); Archibald v.
Braverman, 79 Cal.Rptr. 723 (Cal.App. 1969); and Owens v.
Children's Memorial Hospital, 480 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1973).
The facts of the instant case clearly do not support
recovery for emotional distress to the plaintiff parents as a
result of the alleged negligent infliction of injuries upon their
infant daughter.

Although plaintiffs cite two lower court

opinions from other jurisdictions as support for this claim, the
overwhelming majority of cases throughout the country would not
provide recovery.

The third cause of action in the complaint

clearly shows that plaintiff, Mr. Reiser, has not suffered any
physical injuries whatsoever, and the physical injuries incurred
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by Mrs. Reiser are not alleged to have been caused by the actual
emotional distress that she incurred as a result of the injuriu
to her child.

Further, the injuries to the infant daughter did

not involve a single traumatic observable accident.
POINT VI.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO POINTS IV AND V,
PLAINTIFFS RICHARD AND ELEANOR REISER'S
CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL.
n~

Even if the parents' claims in the instant case are

barred by reason of the expiration of the statute of limitations
or by reason of a failure to properly state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, the parents are "collaterally estopped"
from pursuing their claims against the defendants.

The doctrine

of collateral estoppel, which is either a part of or a cousin
to the doctrine of res judicata, is said to reflect the

refus~

of the law, "to tolerate a multiplicity of, or needless,
litigation•.

46 Am.Jur. 2d, Judgments, 561 §395.

While certain

aspects of the res judicata doctrine have the effect of
precluding a plaintiff from reli tigating the same cause of action
against the same defendant, the doctrine of collateral estoppel
precludes the relitigation, in a second action, of an issue

~~

has been actually and necessarily litigated and determined in a
prior matter which was based on a different cause of action.
46 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments, 563-567, §396-398; Restatement of the
Law, Judgments, §45, comment (c); In re West Jordan, Inc., 7 Utan
2d 391, 326 P.2d 105 (Utah 1958).
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A.

All Issues Have Been Litigated and Resolved in

Favor of Defendants.
The general rule is that the doctrine of collateral
estoppel only applies when a question of fact essential to and
determinative of the judgment is actually litigated and determined by a valid or final judgment which is conclusive as between
the parties to a subsequent action on a different cause of
action.

In re West Jordan, 7 Utah 2d at 394, 46 Am.Jur.2d,

Judgments, 591 §422.
There should be no dispute in the instant case that the
issues of liability against defendants that would be raised in a
new trial by the plaintiff parents, would simply be a relitigation of the same issues already tried.

If the plaintiff Eleanor

Reiser has a claim for personal injuries, it is based on the same
theory as the claim for personal injuries on the part of the
infant plaintiff, Elizabeth.

Furthermore, the claim for emo-

tional distress on the part of the father, Richard Reiser, is
somewhat derivative in nature and could not be based on any issue
of liability against the defendants that has not already been
fully litigated in the prior action.
B.

The Plaintiff Parents Are in Privity With the

Infant Plaintiff.
It is well settled that the doctrine of collateral
estoppel or the doctrine of res judicata binds only those who
were parties to the original proceedings or those who were in
"privity" with the parties to the original proceedings.

~

Allen Mining co. v. Park Galena Mining Co., 77 Utah 362, 296 P.
231 (1931); Ruffinengo v. Miller, 579 P.2d 342 {Utah 1978) •
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~

The United States Supreme Court in Chicago R.I.&P.

Co. v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611, 70 L.Ed. 757 (1926), characterizec
the necessary relationship for res judicata and collateral

es~~

pel purposes as "substantial identity", rather than privity, be·
tween the parties.

Under the Schendel doctrine, the true testh

whether the person whose interest is represented in the two suits
is the same.

The substantial interest test described in the

Schendel case appears to be somewhat the same as the definition
that the Utah Supreme Court gave to the concept of privity in
Glen Allen Mining Co. v. Park Galena Mining Co., supra.
This identity of interest has been found to be present
in several cases involving separate actions brought by husband
and wife or separate actions brought by parent and child.

In

Wilkey v. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 322 P.2d 1058
(Okla. 1957), three separate lawsuits were filed against

defe~

dant based on injuries and death occurring incident to a
bus/truck accident.

The driver of the truck filed two

wrongf~

death actions on behalf of his wife and daughter, and a separate
action for his own injuries and for property damage to his
vehicle.

The wrongful death action on behalf of his wife was

brought to trial first and a verdict was rendered in favor of
defendant.

The defendant then sought to have the first

judgment rendered conclusive as to the other two lawsuits fil~
and the lower court granted defendant's motion.

The Oklahoma

Supreme Court affirmed the lower court, holding that plaintiffs
were "collaterally es topped" from litigating the same issues of
liability against the defendant.
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Further in Laws v. Fisher, 513 P.2d 876 (Okla. 1973),
the court applied collateral estoppel to a husband's action
brought after the wife of plaintiff had previously brought an
action against the same defendant, and a judgment had been granted
for defendants, for damages arising from injuries to her in an
automobile accident.

The husband, as driver of the vehicle, was

asserting the claim for loss of the wife's services, society and
companionship, consortium and other damages to himself, and also
for damages to and loss of use of his automobile.

In granting

defendant's motion for a judgment as a matter of law in favor of
defendant, the court held that the husband and wife were "in
privity" and there appeared to be no "adversity of interest"
between the two.

513 A.2d at 878.

In the instant case any further litigation on the part
of the parents against defendants would in fact be a litigation
of the same issues by parties who are in "privity" with the
plaintiff in the earlier action determined in favor of
defendants.

There should be little doubt that the interests of

the parents are substantially identical to those of the infant
plaintiff in pursuing their claims.

c.

The Plaintiff Parents Controlled and Participated

Fully in the Litigation.
One generally recognized exception to the requirement
that the parties be tne same or in privity is found in the
situation where an individual who is not a party to the litigation participates in the case to such a degree that the policies
underlying the privity requirement are not applicable and res
judicata or collateral estoppel will be applied to any subsequent
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-45-

action.

In the instant case, the parents should be

collater~~

estopped because they participated fully in the litigation

wi~

litigat~

their daughter as plaintiff and in fact controlled the

to such a degree that the parents cannot claim a denial of due
process or that they did not have their "day in court".
The leading case applying this general exception
referred to is Souffront v. Campagine Des Sucreries, 217

u.s.

475, 54 L. Ed. 846 (1910), and it has been very recently applied
by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Montana v.
United States, 440 U.S. 147, 99

s.

Ct. 970, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210

(February 22, 1979).
In Cauefield v. Fidelity

&

Cas. Co., 378 F. 2d 876 (5th

Cir. 1967), the defendants had cleared some of their land and in
the process allegedly desecrated a cemetery as well.

A

suit was

brought by one individual claiming damages as a result of the
desecration of the cemetery, a trial was held, and the jury
that the desecration had not occurred.

A

fu~

later suit was brought

by different plaintiffs and the trial court held as a matter of
law that an estoppel would work to defeat the second lawsuit.
The circuit court affirmed applying the general rule of

non-part~

participation in the litigation.
In a Law Review note that analyzed Cauefield and other
similar cases, the author discusses the merits of the Cauefie~
opinion:
In Cauefield v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., for
example, the interest of the litigant in
not being estopped on the basis of a
prior action to which he was not a party
is hardly compelling. The plaintiff's
claim of cemetery desecration was idenSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tical to the claim litigated in the prior
action, his attorney was also the attorney in that action. The plaintiff not
only knew of the prior action at the time
it took place, but even testified, as did
all the other potential plaintiffs.
Moreover, the plaintiff conceded that he
could produce no new evidence, and the
simplicity of the factual questions and
governing legal propositions made it
unlikely that a different strategy or set
of arguments, if pursued, would make much
difference. In light of these factors,
the plaintiff's interest in Cauefield in
being free to relitigate the issue of
liability is not of paramount
importance. 87 Harvard L. Rev.,
"Collateral Estoppel of Non-parties",
p. 1485.
As in Cauefield, the plaintiff parents in the instant
case were actually in control of the litigation.

The attorney

hired to represent the parents was the same attorney that represented the interests of the infant plaintiff.

Further, the

parents testified at both trials and were in attendance during
most of the trials wherein it was ultimately determined that
defendants were not liable, and it is difficult to see how the
parents could produce any further evidence that was not already
presented.
The participating non-party rule has been recognized
widely throughout the country and should apply as a matter of
public policy to a case of this nature.

Restatement of

Judgments, §84; 50 c.J.S., Judgments, 317, §782; Ritchie v.
Landau, 475 F.2d 151 (2nd Cir. 1973); Kreager v. General
Electric co., 497 F.2d 468 (2nd Cir. 1974), cert. denied 95 s.ct.
111, (1974); Kamstra v. Bolles, 434 P.2d 539 (Alas. 1967).
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CONCLUSION
The lower court did not err in granting defendants•
motion in limine, in refusing to present the issue of informed
consent to the jury, and in presenting the special verdict form,
Further, the lower court did not err in granting the
summary judgment for Mrs. Reiser' s alleged personal injuries and
for the parents' claim for emotional distress.
Respectfully submitted this

~

day of June, 1980.
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